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THE TOO OFTEN LATE ARRIVAL OF WISDOM, OR, 

WHAT TO DO WITH TRADE ACCOUNTS PAYABLE 

AND RECEIVABLE UNDER SECTION 357(c) OF THE 

INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954* 

I. INTRODUCTION 
Another chapter has been added in the continuing struggle of 
the Internal Revenue Service, the United States Tax Court, law re­
view commentators, and· cash basis taxpayers to arrive at a satisfac­
tory definition of "liabilities" as that term is used in section 357 of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 1 The Tax Court, in the case of 
Focht v. Commissioner,2 has now reversed itself, in a divided opin­
ion, and forsaken its literal interpretation of the term "liabilities" in 
section 357, opting instead for the holding that an obligation, to the 
extent that its payment would have been deductible if made by the 
taxpayer, shall not, for the purposes of sections 357 and 358, be 
treated as a liability. This article seeks to integrate the new deci­
sion with its predecessors and to evaluate the chances of success of 
the solution it proposes. 
The problem stems from a decision by Congress to encourage 
business activity by deferring recognition of gain at the time of 
incorporation. 3 Section 351 of the 1954 Code provides that there 
shall be no recognition of gain or loss when property is transferred 
* "Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely be­
. cause it comes late." Justice Frankfurter in Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 
595, 600 (1949), as quoted by Simpson, J., in his concurring opinion in Focht v. 
Commissioner, 68 T.C. 223, 238 (1977), appeal docketed, No. 78-1118 (3d Cir. Feb. 
2, 1978). 
1. See chronologically, Raich v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 604 (1966); Bongiovanni 
v. Commissioner, 470 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1972), rev'g 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1124 (1971); 
Thatcher v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 28 (1973), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 533 F.2d 
1114 (9th Cir. 1976). See also Rev. Rul. 69-442, 1969-2 C.B. 53, Del Cotto, Section 
357(c}; Some Observations of Tax Effects to the Cash Basis Taxpayer, 24 BUFFALO 
L. REV. 1 (1974); Kahn and Oesterle, A Definition of "Liabilities" in Internal Revenue 
Code Sections 357 and 358(d}, 73 MICH. L. REV. 461 (1975); Roha, Application of 
Section 357(c} of the Internal Revenue Code to a Section 351 Transfer of Accollnts 
Receivable alld Payable, 24 CATH. L. REV. 243 (1975); Note, Section 357(c} and 
the Cash Basis Taxpayer, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1154 (1967). 
2. 68 T.C. 223 (1977), appeal docketed, No. 78-1118 (3d Cir. Feb. 2, 1978). 
3. The predecessor of I.R.C. § 351 is § 202(c)(3) of the Revenue Act of 1921, 
Pub. L. No. 67-98, 42 Stat. 230. The stated purpose behind the adoption of 
§ 202(c)(3) was the facilitation of necessary business readjustments. S. Rep. No. 275, 
67 Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1921), reprillted in 1939-1 C.B. (part 2) 188-89. 
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to a corporation solely in exchange for stock or securities, provided 
that the transferors of such property are in control of the corpora­
tion immediately after the exchange. 4 Section 351 further provides 
that if other property or money is received in addition to stock or 
securities, gain may be recognized, but only to the extent of the to­
tal amount of such other property or money received. 5 The question 
soon arose whether the assumption of liabilities of the transferor by 
the transferee corporation constitutes "other property or money" 
for the purposes of gain recognition under section 35l. 
The United States Supreme Court answered this question in 
the affirmative in the 1938 case of United States v. Hendler.6 View­
ing the assumption of liabilities by the transferee corporation as the 
constructive receipt of money by the transferor, the Supreme 
Court reversed the lower court holding that the taxpayer was pro­
tected because there was no actual payment of money or other 
property.7 ''The Hendler Company was the beneficiary of the dis­
charge of its indebtedness. Its gain was as real and substantial as if 
4. I.R.C. § 351 reads as follows: 

§ 351. Transfer to corporation controlled by transferor 

(a) General rule.-No gain or loss shall be recognized if property is 
transferred to a corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange for 
stock or securities in such corporation and immediately after the exchange 
such person or persons are in control (as defined in section 368(c)) of the 
corporation. For purposes of this section, stock or securities issued for ser­
vices shall not be considered as issued in return for property. 
(b) Receipt of property.-If subsection (a) would apply to an exchange 
but for the fact that there is received, in addition to the stock or securities 
permitted to be received under subsection (a), other property or money, 
then­
(1) gain (if any) to such recipient shall be recognized, but not in 
excess of­
(A) the amount of money received, plus 
(B) the fair market value of such other property received; and 
(2) no loss to such recipient shall be recognized. 
(c) Special rule.-In determining control, for purposes of this section, 
the fact that any corporate transferor distributes part or all of the stock which . 
it receives in the exchange to its shareholders shall not be taken into ac­
count. 
(d) Exception.-This section shall not apply to a transfer of property to 
an investment company. 
5. For example, if A transfers appreciated property to a corporation in an ex­
change that qualifies for I.R.C. § 351 treatment and in return receives stock plus a 
machine with a fair market value of 50 and cash of 100, then gain to A can be recog­
nized to the extent of 150. 
6. 303 U.S. 564 (1938). 
7. 91 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1937). 
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the money had been paid it and then paid over by it to its cred­
itors. "8 
Displeased with such a result, Congress immediately re­
sponded in 1939 with the passage of section 112(k) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1939,9 which provided that assumption of a liabil­
ity or receipt of property subject to a liability by the transferee 
corporation would not be considered as money or other property 
for the purpose of determining gain. The House of Representatives 
report specifically referred to the Hendler decision and urged pas­
sage of the new provision on the ground that otherwise the non­
recognition treatment of corporate reorganizations would in effect 
be nullified. 10 The only limitation imposed on the new rule was 
8. 303 U.S. at 566; for a detailed analysis of Hendler, see Surrey, Assumption of 
Indebtedness in Tax-Free Exchanges, 50 YALE L.J. 1 (1940). 
9. 	 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, Ch. 1, § 112(k), 53 Stat. 870 (Now I.R.C. § 357(a) and 
(b)) 	reads as follows: 

§ 112. Recognition of gain or loss 

(k) Assumption of Liability not recognized.~Where upon an exchange 
the taxpayer receives as part of the consideration property which would be 
permitted by subsection (b)(4) or (5) of this section to be received without 
the recognition of gain if it were the sole consideration, and, as part of the 
consideration another party to the exchange assumes a liability of the tax­
payer or acquires from the taxpayer property subject to a liability, such as­
sumption or acquisition shall not be considered as 'other property Or money' 
received by the taxpayer within the meaning of subsection (c), (d), or (e) of 
this section and shall not prevent the exchange from being within the provi­
sions of subsection (b)(4) or (5); except that if, taking into consideration the 
nature of the liability and the circumstances in the light of which the ar­
rangement for the assumption or acquisition was made, it appears that the 
principal purpose of the taxpayer with respect to the assumption or acquisi ­
tion was a purpose to avoid Federal income tax on the exchange, or, if not 
such purpose, was not a bona fide business purpose, such assumption or 
acquisition (in the amount of the liability) shall, for the purposes of this 
section, be considered as money received by the taxpayer upon the ex­
change. 
10. H.R. Rep. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1939), reprinted in 1939-2 C.B. 
518-19 which states: 
The recent Supreme Court case of United States v. Hendler (303 U.S. 
564 (1938)) has been broadly interpreted to require that, if a taxpayer's 
liabilities are assumed by another party in what is otherwise a tax-free reor­
ganization, gain is recognized to the extent of the assumption. In typical 
transactions changing the form or entity of a business it is not customary to 
liquidate the liabilities of the business and such liabilities are almost invari­
ably assumed by the corporation which continues the business. Your com­
mittee therefore believes that such a broad interpretation as is indicated 
above will largely nullify the provisions of existing law which postpone the 
recognition of gain in such cases. To enable bona fide transactions of this 
type to be carried on without the recognition of gain, the committee has 
recommended section 213 of the bill. 
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that if a tax avoidance purpose or the absence of a bona fide busi­
ness purpose could be shown, the assumed liabilities would then 
be treated as money received by the taxpayer on the exchange. 
In 1954, section 112(k) became section 357(a) and (b). A new 
provision, section 357(c)11 was added to provide a further limitation 
on the basic rule. Section 357(c) sets forth the following test: If the 
amount of the liabilities assumed plus the amount of the liabilities 
11. I.R.C. § 357 reads as follows: 

§ 357. Assumption of liability 

(a) General rule.-Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), if ­
(1) the taxpayer receives property which would be permitted to be 
received under section 351, 361, 371, or 374' without the recognition 
of gain if it were the sole consideration, and 
(2) as part of the consideration, another party to the exchange assumes 
a liability of the taxpayer, or acquires from the taxpayer property sub­
ject to a liability, 
then such assumption or acquisition shall not be treated as money or other 
property, and shall not prevent the exchange from being within the provi­
sions of section 351, 361, 371, or 374, as the case may be. 
(b) Tax avoidance purpose.­
(1) In general.-If, taking into consideration the nature of the liability 
and the circumstances in the light of which the arrangement for the 
assumption or acquisition was made, it appears that the principal pur­
pose of the taxpayer with respect to the assumption or acquisition de­
scribed in subsection (a)­
(A) was a purpose to avoid Federal income tax on the exchange, or 
(B) if not such purpose, was not a bona fide business purpose, 
then such assumption or acquisition (in the total amount of the liabil ­
ity assumed or acquired pursuant to such exchange) shall, for purposes 
of section 351, 361, 371, or 374 (as the case may be), be considered as 
money received by the taxpayer on the exchange. 
(2) Burden of Proof.-In any suit or proceeding where the burden is 
on the taxpayer to prove such assumption or acquisition is not to be 
treated as money received by the taxpayer, such burden shall not be 
considered as sustained unless the taxpayer sustains such burden by 
the clear preponderance of the evidence. 
(c) Liabilities in excess of basis. ­
(1) In general.-In the case of an exchange­
(A) to which section 351 applies, or 
(B) to which section 361 applies by reason of a plan of reorganiza­
tion within the meaning of section 368(a)( I)(D), 
if the sum of the amount of the liabilities assumed, plus the amount of 
the liabilities to which the property is subject, exceeds the total ad­
justed basis of the property transferred pursuant to such exchange, 
then such excess shall be considered as a gain from the sale or ex­
change of a capital asset or of property which is not a capital asset, as 
the case may be. 
(2) Exceptions.-Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any exchange to 
which­
(A) subsection (b)( 1) of this section applies, or 
(B) section 371 or 374 applies, 
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to which the property is subject exceeds the total adjusted basis of 
the assets transferred in a section 351 exchange, then gain shall be 
recognized to the extent of the excess amount. On its face, section 
357(c), like other provisions of the code, presents an objective test 
that can be mechanically applied, rather than a subjective test such 
as that used in section 357(b).12 
II. THE TREATMENT OF TRADE ACCOUNTS 

PAYABLE AND RECEIVABLE UNDER SECTION 357(c) 

It soon became evident, however, that the "objective" test set 
forth in the new section 357(c), if applied mechanically, could re­
sult in unjust consequences. In 1966, the Tax Court decided Raich 
v. Commissioner.13 There, for the first time, the problem of a 
transfer by a cash basis sole proprietorship of accounts receivable 
and accounts payable to a corporation under a section 351 exchange 
was encountered head-on. The court held that trade accounts pay­
able should be treated as liabilities within the definition of that 
term in section 357(c). Therefore, because of the zero basis treat­
ment of accounts receivable for a cash basis taxpayer14 and the lack 
of other assets transferred, the test in section 357(c) yielded a sub­
stantial gain. This holding, as the Raich court itself was aware, 
might well lead to unfair results. Probably to avoid personal liabil­
ity, the taxpayer changed the form of his business from that of a 
sole proprietorship to a corporation. That apparently simple step 
resulted in a significant tax liability. The court observed that "the 
result reached may conflict with the well-established intent of Con­
gress to foster tax-free business reorganizations. "15 However, since 
the term "liabilities" was not used as a term of art or further defined 
when adopted, the court felt bound by its plain meaning which 
12. See I.R.C. § 731(a)(l), where, in the case of a partnership distribution to a 
partner, no gain is recognized unless the amount of money received exceeds the ad­
justed basis of the partner's interest in the partnership. See also I.R.C. § 733, which 
would indicate that gain is so recognized to avoid the problem of a negative basis. 
Section 733 provides that "in the case of a distribution by a partnership to a partner 
other than in liquidation of a partner's interest, the adjusted basis to such partner of 
his interest in the partnership shall be reduced (but not below zero) ...." The 
dearth of legislative history indicating congressional intent behind adoption of I.R.C. 
§ 357(c) will be discussed infra note 30 and accompanying text. 
13. 46 T.C. 604 (1966). 
14. Ezo Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 385 (1961). See also 46 T.C. at 
610 where it is stated that "accounts receivable in the hands of a cash basis taxpayer 
have a basis of zero." (footnote omitted). 
15. lei. at 611. 
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would necessarily include debts such as trade accounts payable. 16 
The Tax Court and the Internal Revenue Service continued in 
their course of literal interpretation but were presented with two 
serious setbacks. The first came in a decision handed down by the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Bongiovanni v. Commis­
sioner.17 There, the court reversed a memorandum opinion of the 
Tax Court on the theory that the term "liabilities" as it was used in 
section 357(c) was not meant to include mere accounting liabilities 
but rather "what might be called 'tax' liabilities, i.e., liens in ex­
cess of tax costs, particularly mortgages encumbering property 
.	transferred in a Section 351 transaction. "18 The Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit in Thatcher v. Commissioner19 agreed with the 
result in Bongiovanni but disliked the ad hoc method by which it 
was reached. Therefore it adopted Judge Hall's dissenting opinion 
from the Tax Court's consideration of Thatcher: trade accounts pay­
able are to be viewed as liabilities so that gain will be immediately 
recognized under section 357(c), but an offsetting deduction may 
be available when the payables are paid. 20 
16. For an apparent stage whisper by the Internal Revenue Service to taxpayers 
in the predicament of Mr. Raich, see Rev. Rul. 69-442, 1969-2 C.B. 53 at 54 where it 
is stated: 
The IRS will apply section 357(c) of the Code to other situations involving 
similar facts [in reference to the Raich casel inasmuch as such section liter­
ally applies and the legislative history clearly supports the application of 
that section under such circumstances. However, the Service wishes to point 
out that the trade accounts receivable would not have a zero basis if the 
taxpayer had been on the accrual method of accounting prior to the transfer 
of the business under section 351 of the Code. 
In other words, the easiest way to avoid the whole problem is to simply switch from 
a cash basis method of accounting to an accrual basis method of accounting and 
forget the definitional subtleties of "liabilities" as it is used in § 357(c). This is cer­
tainly a pragmatic approach but not of much assistance to those taxpayers who have 
already erred. See notes 32 & 44 illfra. 
17. 470 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1972), rev'g 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1124 (1971). 
18. 470 F.2d at 924. 
19. 533 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'g ill part alld aff'g ill part 61 T.C. 28 
(1973). It should be noted that the course of literalism was not without its unwilling 
followers, as witnessed by the five dissents in the Thatcher Tax Court opinion. 
20. 533 F.2d at 1117-18. Judge Hall's approach views the transfer of both the 
receivables and the payables to the corporation as a sale, payment of the payables 
representing the consideration given for the future receipt of income from the re­
ceivables. Thus, if A transfers 100 of receivables and 75 of payables and an asset 
with a basis of 20, the § 357(c) gain (liabilities assumed of 75 minus basis of assets 
transferred of 20) would be 55. However, as the receivables are greater in amount 
than the § 357(c) gain, if the transferee corporation makes actual payment of the pay­
abies in the year of the exchange, the proposed deduction would be available to off­
set the entire § 357(c) gain. Such an approach retains the broad meaning of "liabilities" 
while lessening somewhat the harsh results of the Raich rule. 
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III. THE FOCHT CASE 
In the Focht21 case the court faced the same situation encoun­
tered in Raich, Bongiovanni, and Thatcher: the transfer of trade 
accounts receivable and payable along with other assets by a cash 
basis taxpayer in a section 351 exchange. The zero basis of the 
receivables combines with the liability status of the payables to 
produce a gain that may be recognized under section 357(c).22 The 
majority opinion in Focht began with a consideration of the all­
inclusive Tax Court treatment of liabilities in Raich and Thatcher. 
It noted that more equitable results could not be reached in those 
cases because there was no satisfactory rationale for giving 
liabilities a more limited meaning. The court then turned to the 
methods used in Bongiovanni and Thatcher to nullify the effects of 
section 357(c) with respect to trade payables, concluding that "it is 
time for us to reconsider"23 the question. 
The nub of the majority argument, based upon the legislative 
history of section 357(c) and the judicial decisions surrounding it, is 
that section 357(c) was not meant to apply to those liabilities, the 
payment of which would have been deductible by the transferor. 24 
The court reasoned that narrowing the definition of "liabilities" is 
required by the interaction of the Hendler25 case, the adoption of 
section 112(k), and the subsequent Supreme Court case of Crane v. 
Commissioner,26 which held that assumption of a mortgage by a 
buyer of real property was to be included as part of the amount 
realized on the exchange by the seller. In Hendler, the only 
liabilities in question were mortgage bonds. Interest and merchan­
dise accounts, both deductible items, were ignored by the Court. 
Similarly, the Court in Crane did not consider the interest due on 
the mortgage and unpaid at the time of the transfer to be an 
amount realized by the transferor. 27 Since deductible liabilities 
21. 68 T.C. 223 (1977), appeal docketed, No. 78-1118 (3d Cir. Feb. 2, 1978). 
22. For the exact figures in the instant case, see id. at 225. The total assets 
transferred amounted to $77,704.10, of which $42,237.10 represented accounts re­
ceivable, while the total liabilities assumed equalled $88,979, with $73,729 constitut­
ing accounts payable. The adjusted basis of the assets so transferred was $35,467. Thus, 
the Commissioner determined that ordinary gain under I.R.C. § 357(c) was recognized 
in the amount of $53,512. 
23. Id. at 229. 
24. It is interesting to note that the court indicated as general support for its 
new interpretation of § 357(c) the arguments developed in a law review article. Id. at 
229 n.12 where Kahn and Oesterle, supra note 1, is cited. 
25. 303 U.S. 564 (1938). 
26. 331 U.S. 1 (1947). 
27. Id. at 4 n.6 where the Court stated: "The Commissioner explains that only 
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were excluded from the amount realized in Hendler, and since 
section 112(k) was enacted in response to the Hendler decision, it 
follows that the meaning given liabilities in Hendler must have been 
incorporated into that section. The Focht court viewed the subse­
quent decision in Crane as a clear and approving enunciation of the 
principles first recognized in Hendler. 28 
The cornerstone of the opinion, then, is that section 112(k), 
now section 357(a) and (b), purposely used the term "liabilities"29 in 
a restriCted sense. The court next turned its attention to the lack of 
express legislative intent to use a broader definition when section 
357(c) was adopted, interpreting this silence to mean that section 
357(c), in the contemplation of Congress, was to operate only as a 
limitation on section 357(a). Therefore, as section 357(a) does not 
apply to liabilities, the payment of which would be deductible, 
neither should section 357(c). The court reasoned that Congress 
adopted section 357(c) in response to the unsatisfactory operation of 
the subjective test set forth in section 357(b): "[Olne can speculate 
the principal amount, rather than the total present debt secured by the mortgage, was 
deemed to be a measure of the amount realized, because the difference was attribut­
able to interest due, a deductible item." 
The appanmt logic of the exclusion of interest from the amount realized is that it 
is unnecessary because of the wash that will later result. See Kahn and Oesterle, 
supra note 1, at 468. If interest were included in the amount realized, that inclusion 
would only be offset later by the deduction allowed because of its actual payment. 
I.R.C. § 163. 
28. "Implicit in this conclusion [that the Supreme Court in Hendler would 
have allowed the Hendler Co., the transferor, a deduction for interest paid by Bor­
den, the transferee, on the mortgages Borden assumed] is the view that Hendler 
foreshadowed Cralle's exclusionary treatment of assumed deductible liabilities, an 
exclusion we now find incorporated into sections 357 and 358." 68 T.C. at 234 (citac 
tions omitted). 
The court's reasrming appears more than a little tenuous, however, as it is based 
on the arguable assu:nption that what was more clearly stated in Crane (deductible 
liabilities are not to be treated as part of the amount received) was also inferred in 
Helldler. If it cannot be shown that Hendler used a special meaning of the term 
"liabilities," the link with the adoption of § 112(k) is broken. Cralle was decided sub­
sequent to the adoption of § 112(k) and its holding therefore could not have had any 
influence on congressional deliberations with respect to that section. The Kahn and 
Oesterle article, supra note 1, at 473, acknowledges this distinction but concludes 
that even if Helldler did not use the same reasoning as Crane, the Cralle opinion by 
itself should be suIHcient authority to so limit the definition of "liabilities." 
29. It should be pointed out that the provisions of § 112(k) were adopted si­
multaneously with a section mandating a complimentary adjustment in basis to the 
stock received by the transferors in a § 351 exchange. Liabilities assumed were not to 
be used in determining gain but were to be included within the purview of the 
phrase "other property or money" for basis calculations. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, 
Ch. 1, § 113(a), 53 Stat. 872 (now I.R.C. § 358(d)). 
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that Congress was dissatisfied with the operation of what is now 
section 357(b) (the tax-avoidance safeguard to section 357(a)) be­
cause it was too subjective and dependent upon a determination of 
a taxpayer's motive. "30 
The result under the majority opinion is that trade accounts 
payable will not be treated as liabilities for the purposes of section 
357(c). Their payment would yield a resulting deduction. under sec­
tion 162 as a business expense. Therefore, they are not within the 
scope of section 357(a), as that scope is defined by legislative his­
tory and intent. 
To fully appreciate the import of this decision, and its underly­
ing rationale, an example is helpful. Assume A is a sole proprietor­
ship on the cash basis method of accounting, with tangible assets of 
60 (with an adjusted basis of 40), accounts receivable of 50, and ac­
counts payable of 50. IfA were to first liquidate the payables and re­
ceivables and then incorporate, he would realize ordinary income of 
50, offset by a section 162 deduction of 50, with net income of zero. 
Under section 351, no gain would result upon incorporation. The 
pent-up gain of 20 (the appreciation of the assets from 40 to 60) 
would be preserved through the use of transfer basis because under 
section 358 the stock received' by A would have a basis of 40 and a 
fair market value of 60. IfA subsequently sold his stock, he would 
realize a gain of 20. 
30. 68 T.C. at 235. There have been '~everal theories advanced with respect to 
the legislative intent behind the adoption "pf § 357(c). The unworkability of the test 
in § 357(b) is one of them. A second theory is that illustrated by the examples used 
in the House and Senate committee reports and in the accompanying Treasury regu­
lations. Such examples involve mortgages'\on real property in amounts greater than 
the adjusted basis of the lands involved. Recognition of gain on the assumption of 
those mortgages under § 357(c) is seen as a recapture provision for the depreciation 
that has been taken on the borrowed funds. See S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 270 (1954) reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4908; H.R. Rep. 
No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A129 (1954) reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 4267; Treas. Reg. § 1.357-2(a). See also Del Cotto, supra note 1, at 6 for a 
discussion of the recapture theory. A third theory proposes that § 357(c) was adopted 
to solidify prior administrative practices into law. See Easson v. Commissioner, 33 
T.C.963, 971 (1960), rev'd, 294 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1961); Rosen v. Commissioner, 62 
T.C. 11, 19 n.3 (1974). Finally, the theory with the most adherents is that § 357(c) was 
enacted to avoid the possibility of a negative basis. See Cooper, Negative Basis, 75 
HARv. L. REV. 1352 (1962); Commissioner v. Easson, 294 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1961). 
The Easson case is interesting in that the Tax Court, in applying § 112(k) of the 1939 
Code in a situation subsequent to the adoption of the 1954 Code, reached the same 
result that would have been dictated by § 357(c) on the ground that if the excess be­
tween liabilities and basis was not taxed at that point, it might never be taxed. The 
court of appeals reversed, using a negative basis theory, citing Parker v. Delaney, 
186 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950) (Magruder, c.J., concurring) as authority. See 294 F.2d at 
658. See also note 12 supra. 
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If, however, A chooses to transfer the unliquidated payables 
and receivables to his corporation in addition to the tangible assets, 
far different consequences result. Prior to Focht, section 357(c) 
would dictate immediate recognition of 10 worth of gain, as the lia­
bilities assumed (accounts payable of 50) exceed the adjusted basis 
of the assets transferred (tangible assets, basis 40; receivables, basis 
0) by 10. The basis of the stock received by A would be zero. Un­
der section 358, the basis of the stock is calculated by subtracting 
from the adjusted basis of the assets transferred (40) the amount of 
the liabilities assumed (50) and then adding the amount of the gain 
recognized (10). So, 40 - 50 + 10 yields the zero figure. IfA were 
to then sell his stock, he would recognize a gain of 60. Thus, under 
the second approach, A's total gain is 70, while under the first 
approach, it is only 20 and it is totally deferred as A will not even 
recognize the 20 gain until the stock is sold. 31 In the second situa­
tion, precisely the result that section 112(k) sought to prevent oc­
curs. A is being penalized for failing to liquidate his assets and 
liabilities prior to incorporation. An obstacle is thus placed in the 
way of those who seek to make smooth business readjustments. 
One clear solution to the problem posed by the above exam­
ples is to liquidate payables and receivables prior to incorporation. 
A change from the cash basis method of accounting to the accrual 
method will also avoid the extra taxation. 32 But for those who 
blunder ahead unknowingly, like Focht, Thatcher, and Bongiovanni, 
the statutory framework has now been adjusted to ameliorate the 
harshness of section 357(c). Under the Focht rule, accounts payable 
will not be considered as a liablity under either section 357 or 
section 358 and therefore no gain will be recognized under section 
351. The stock received by the transferor will have a transferred 
basis, thus preserving the pent-up gain caused by the appreciation 
of tangible assets. . 
31. The 70 gain figure can be seen as composed of the 20 gain from the ap­
preciation of the assets and the 50 of income from the receivables. However, the 
wash that occurs if the payables and the receivables are liquidated prior to incorpora­
tion does not result in situation two because payment of the payables by the trans­
feree corporation yields a deduction against ordinary income, not a reduction of 
basis. Thus, after incorporation in situation two, receipt of the receivables and pay­
ment of the payables will produce no income for the corporation, see note 35 infra, 
but the zero basis of the stock will at some time produce a gain of 60. A is recogniz­
ing the 50 amount of gain as represented by the receivables twice in situation two, 
once as ordinary income and a second time as gain from the sale of the stock. 
32. If the taxpayer were on an accrual method of accounting, the receivables 
would not have a zero basis and the § 357(c) calculation would not have to be made. 
See note 16 supra. 
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However, to completely equalize the tax consequences be­
tween a pre-incorporation liquidation and a post-incorporation 
liquidation of accounts payable and receivable by a cash basis tax­
payer, one further step has to be taken. Final resolution of the 
problems created by section 357(c) demands that the question of 
who will be credited with the income from the receivables and the 
deduction from the payables be answered. In the above example, 
the transferee corporation should realize 50 of income when the 
accounts receivable are collected and a corresponding deduction of 
50 should result when the payables are paid. In such a way, the 
results of pre-incorporation and post-incorporation liquidation, as 
shown by the two examples above, would be identical and the un­
equal treament of the ill-advised cash basis taxpayer would be 
eliminated. 
The majority opinion, however, does not attempt to decide 
what will occur when the payables are paid and the receivables are 
received. The court merely acknowledged the issue, stating that if 
need not decide the tax consequences to the transferee when it 
pays the assumed liabilities. 33 In an attempt to guide future 
analysis the court cited the Supreme Court case of Magruder v. 
SuppZee34 in a footnote accompanying that statement. Magruder 
held that when real property is conveyed, the grantee cannot, on 
the strength of the allocation of costs at the closing, deduct real 
estate taxes that were not assessed to her. Real estate taxes are 
only deductible by the party against whom they were levied. Such 
a reference suggests that the payment of trade accounts payable 
can only be deducted by the party who incurred them, i.e., the 
transferor. Aside from upsetting the delicate balance of prior judi­
cial and administrative treatment,35 such an allowance would again 
33. 68 T.C. at 238. 
34. 316 U.S. 394 (1942). The rule of Magruder was subsequently modified by 
statute. See I.R.C. § 164(d) which provides for the allocation of real estate tax deduc­
tions based on the date of sale of the property. 
35. See Thatcher v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 28 (1973), where the Tax Court in 
its statement of facts noted that when the accounts payable were paid by the trans­
feree corporation, a deduction was taken and allowed. Further, the income from the 
accounts receivable was also claimed by the transferee corporation. Id. at 31. The 
findings of fact were not disturbed by the circuit court of appeals in its reversal of 
the Tax Court. Thatcher v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 1114, 1116 (9th CiT. 1976). 
Granting both the income and the deduction to the transferee corporation in a 
§ 351 exchange raises two serious questions: assignment of income; and the non­
transferability of deductible obligations. Under assignment of income principles, 
where one earns income or otherwise creates the right to receive and enjoy it, that 
person should not be able to avoid taxation by an assignment to a mere collector or 
conduit. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940). However, there are strong policy 
reasons in § 351 exchanges for not applying these principles. See Hempt Brothers, 
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disturb the equities achieved by excluding payables from the oper­
ation of sections 357 and 358. If the deduction were allowed to the 
transferor and the income credited to the transferee, the wash that 
should result will not occur because the corporation and the sole 
proprietor are two separate taxpayers. To achieve tax equity be­
tween the incorporation of a cash basis sole proprietorship and an 
accrual basis sole proprietorship without prior liquidation of pay­
abIes and receivables, both the income from the receivables and 
the deduction from the payables should be granted to the trans­
feree corporation. 
Two other criticisms of the majority's opinion in Focht, taken 
from Judge Hall's vigorous and sometimes caustic dissent, should 
also be considered. 36 First, the opinion now casts doubt on the 
meaning of the word "liabilities" wherever it appears in the complex 
framework of the Internal Revenue Code. 37 Yet, she contends, the 
Inc. v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1172 (M.D. Pa. 1973), afI'd, 490 F.2d 1172 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974), where the court held that transferred accounts 
receivable from a partnership to a corporation should be taxable to the corporation 
due to the overriding purpose of § 351 to facilitate business readjustments. 
Moreover, assignment of income has generally been used by the Service only when 
a tax avoidance motivation is present. See, e.g., Brown v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 
337 (2d Cir. 1940); Commissioner v. Griffiths, 103 F.2d 110 (7th Cir. 1939), aff'd, 308 
U,S. 355 (1939); Weinberg v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 233 (1965), aff'd per curiam 
sub nom. Commissioner v. Sugar Daddy, Inc., 386 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. 
denied, 392 U.S. 928 (1968). A finding then, that accounts receivable can be credited 
as income to the transferee corporation in a § 351 exchange, as they were in 
Thatcher, is not inconsistent with prior case law and administrative practice of the 
IRS. 
The non-transferability of deductible items is a harder question to resolve. There 
is strong authority for the proposition that when a taxpayer assumes the liabilities of 
another, he or she cannot subsequently deduct payments made .in satisfaction of 
those liabilities. Magruder v. Supplee, 316 U.S. 394 (1942). See especially Holdcroft 
Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1946) where the court stated that 
"there is no justification for a ruling that the petitioner [transferee corporation] could 
deduct from the gross income of its business, expenses or losses attributable to the 
operation of the business by its predecessor." [d. at 325. The non-transferability of 
deductible items can be viewed as a necessary corollary to the assignment of income 
rationale in that it is a method of preventing sham transactions with a sole motivation 
of tax avoidance. It follows that it is proper for a court to conclude, as was done in 
Hempt Brothers, that the overriding policy reasons behind § 351 require granting the 
deduction to the transferee corporation when no tax avoidance motivation is present. 
36. See the enthusiastic concurring opinions of Judges Simpson and Wilbur in 
Focht v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 223 (1977), appeal docketed, No. 78-1118 (3d Cir. 
Feb. 2, 1978). See quote from Judge Simpson supra note prior to note 1. Judge Wil­
bur especially waxes poetic, quoting from John Chipman Grey, Thucydides, and 
Santayana in applauding the retreat from literalism. 
37. By her count, 400 times throughout the code. 68 T.C. at 244 (Hall, J., dis­
senting). 
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statutory history relied upon by the majority to effect such possible 
sweeping uncertainty is far from conclusive. Congress never specif­
ically stated that the term "liabilities" is only to be given effect ac­
cording to the terms of Hendler and Crane. That inference of legis­
lative intent is followed by the court'S assumption that "liabilities" 
was meant to have the same meaning in section 357(a), (b), and (c). 
The sub-sections, it must be remembered, were adopted fifteen 
years apart and in response to different situations. The plain mean­
ing of "liabilities," as the Raich court recognized,38 includes trade 
accounts payable; any other conclusion rests upon a stretching of 
clear statutory language. 39 
Second, the majority opinion, in attempting to lessen the 
harshness of accounting on the cash basis method, has disturbed 
some of the fundamental mechanics of that method. In excluding 
the value of assumed trade payables from the transferor's gain rec­
ognition at the time of incorporation, a deduction for payment of 
those payables is in effect being received at that time. 40 A basic 
assumption of the cash basis method is that items are not deduct­
ible until paid and income is not credited until received. 
To alleviate these problems, Judge Hall urges the adoption of 
the solution she first proposed in her dissent in Thatcher: that "lia­
bilities" should be given its natural meaning and gain recognized ac­
cordingly at the time of incorporation. 41 She would, however, allow 
the transferor a deduction (to the extent that section 357(c) makes 
the exchange taxable) on the actual payment of the liabilities in­
volved. In this way, payables are netted against receivables with 
38. 46 T.C. 604 (1966). See note 16 supra and accompanying text. 
39. In her dissent Judge Hall strenuously stated: "It has been said, with more 
than a grain of truth, that judges in tax cases these days tend to consult the statute 
only when the legislative history is ambiguous .... What is wrong with reading the 
statute?" 68 T.C. at 244. 
40. Note the strict treatment of assumption of liabilities in previous cases. 
Rosen v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 11 (1974), afI'd, 515 F.2d 503 (1975), where, even 
though the transferor remained personally liable on the liabilities involved, the court 
still held that the assumption involved was income to the transferor. See also Maher 
v. Commissioner, 469 F.2d 225 (8th Cir. 1972), rev'g 55 T.C. 441 (1970), for an en­
tirely different treatment of assumption of liabilities in the dividend area. There it 
was held that if a corporation assumes a personal liability of a shareholder and that 
shareholder remains secondarily liable, a dividend will not occur until the liability is 
actually paid. The justification for such differing treatment is that corporate formation 
calls for an immediate calculation of gain, because of the attendant administrative 
difficulties in determining whether liabilities are ever paid, while the dividend area 
is more conducive to a "wait and see" approach. See also Rev. Rul. 77-360, 1977-42 
I.R.B.6. 
41. 61 T.C. 28, 43 (1973) (Hall, J., dissenting). 
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only the excess being taxed, and the statutory definition of "lia­
bilities" as it appears in sections 357 and 358 and all the other code 
sections is left intact. 42 This solution was later adopted by the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in reversing the Tax Court deci­
sion. 43 
Judge Hall's criticisms of the majority opinion are certainly 
well-taken. However, one must keep in mind the strong policy 
reasons that support the results reached by the majority opinion in 
Focht. The thrust behind section 351 and the congressional re­
sponse to the Hendler decision is that incorporation is not a time 
for gain recognition unless actual money or property is received. A 
sole proprietorship should be able to incorporate without incurring 
a huge tax liability when all that is actually happening is the trans­
fer of an ongoing business to a corporation. Judge Hall's netting 
process only succeeds in negating a section 357(c) gain when pay­
abIes and receivables are both present in comparable amounts and 
when the payables are actually paid within the year of the transfer. 
Under the majority's treatment of "liabilities" in section 357, how­
ever, the trap for cash basis taxpayers created by the Raich rule is 
eliminated and the policy of not hampering necessary business 
readjustments is consequently furthered in a more far-reaching 
manner than that advocated by Judge Hall. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
One small anomaly in the code, the trap for cash basis tax­
payers in section 357(c), has produced torrents of commentary and 
semantic arguments and sent armies of judges and lawyers deep 
into the archives to uncover a satisfactory justification for the de­
sired result. The easiest and most workable solutions, however, still 
seem to be either a change from a cash basis method of accounting 
to an accrual method,44 or a withholding of equal amounts of trade 
payables and receivables. But both of these solutions anticipate 
recognition of the problem before it arises. Since many taxpayers 
42. Id. 
43. See note 20 supra. 
44. See note 16 supra. A change from a cash basis method of accounting to an 
accrual method is at present complicated and time-consuming. See I.R.C. § 446 
where it is provided that in order to change accounting methods, a taxpayer must 
secure the consent of the Internal Revenue Service. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.446­
1(e)(3)(i) which provides that the taxpayer must file an application with the Commis­
sioner of Internal Revenue within 180 days after the beginning of the taxable year in 
which it is desired to make the change. 
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will continue to be caught unaware, the Focht solution certainly 
goes a long way towards reaching tax equity. To completely al­
leviate the disparity in tax treatment between a cash basis taxpayer 
who liquidates accounts receivable and accounts payable before in­
corporation and one who does not, however, the question of who is 
to recognize the subsequent income and deduction from the ac­
counts payable and accounts receivable must be answered. If both 
of these items are credited to the transferee corporation, in the 
absence of a tax avoidance motivation, total equity will be achieved 
in a manner consistent with the basic policy of section 351 to facili­
tate necessary business readjustments. 45 
Sally S. King 
45. See note 35 supra. 
